Principled Realism & Current US Civil-Military Relations

Abstract

This essay analyzes how the Trump administration's "principled realism" foreign policy philosophy strains US civil-military relations (CMR), using the debate over foreign aid as the central case study. Beginning with Samuel Huntington's seminal CMR framework from The Soldier and the State (1957) — professionalism, objective civilian control, the societal imperative, and the functional imperative — the essay argues that principled realism undermines all three core tenets of Huntington's theory by politicizing the military, exploiting its public trust, and providing incoherent strategic guidance. The military's best response is to break from Huntington's apolitical ideal and engage in public advocacy — stopping short of disobedience — to preserve both its institutional credibility and democratic accountability.

I. The Huntingtonian Framework

The Soldier and the State (1957)

Samuel Huntington authored the foundational CMR text against the backdrop of the US-Soviet bipolar struggle. His prescription rests on four interlocking concepts:

1. Military Professionalism — The military is a distinct profession whose autonomy must be preserved. Politicization diminishes effectiveness.
2. Objective Civilian Control — Security depends on a clear division: civilians set strategy, the military autonomously implements at the operational and tactical level.
3. The Societal Imperative — The prevailing societal attitude toward the military; Huntington saw American liberalism as largely "hostile to military institutions."
4. The Functional Imperative — External threats that shape military institutions. For Huntington, this was the USSR.

Peter Feaver, Huntington's own doctoral student, contends that any serious CMR discussion must first wrestle with Huntington — he laid the conceptual base from which all subsequent scholars take off.

What Has Changed

Sarkesian and Connor question whether Huntington's binary — the civilian has the right to be wrong, and the military must resign if it can't comply — is too simplistic for today's conditions. The essay agrees: historic CMR norms must adapt.

II. CMR Today — A Shifted Landscape

The Societal Imperative Has Flipped

Gallup and Pew Research Center (2018) found that Americans trust the military more than any other institution — 74% express "a great deal" or "quite a lot" of confidence. By contrast, Congress sits at 11%. The current societal imperative is politically skeptical and militarily supportive — the inverse of what Huntington assumed.

The Functional Imperative Has Fragmented

Without a monolithic threat like the USSR, the US faces a diverse, nuanced set of perceived and propagated functional imperatives: China, Russia, terrorism, migration, climate change. The 2018 Worldwide Threat Assessment (DNI Dan Coats) devoted more space to "slow economic growth," "challenges from urbanization and migration," and "climate change" than to traditional threats like terrorism or WMDs.

The Politicization Trap

The Trump administration exploits the gap between high military trust and low political trust by:

• Placing current and former generals in high-ranking political positions
• Framing problems in military terms
• Using military resources to legitimize foreign policy initiatives

Huntington would argue this undermines military professionalism. But if politicization is already happening to the military, the question is no longer whether to remain apolitical — it's how to respond.

III. Foreign Aid — The Flashpoint

The Public Misperception

Americans on average believe 28% of the federal budget goes to foreign aid. The actual figure is roughly 1%. This qualitative misunderstanding — citizens can barely name their congressperson, let alone define what foreign aid means — creates a vacuum that principled realism fills with its own narrative.

The Military's Position

Then-General James Mattis before the Senate Armed Services Committee (2013):

"If you don't fund the State Department fully, then I need to buy more ammunition… The more that we put into the State Department's diplomacy, hopefully, the less we have to put into a military budget."

120 retired generals and admirals wrote to Congress: "Development agencies are critical to preventing conflict and reducing the need to put our men and women in uniform in harm's way."

The military views foreign aid as a low-cost, high-reward, preventive investment — a long-term complement to hard security.

Principled Realism's View

White House OMB Director Mick Mulvaney: "The overriding message is fairly straightforward: less money spent overseas means more money spent here."

Trump's first budget proposed a 10% increase in DOD funding offset by a 30% cut to the State Department. The competing conceptions of return on investment are irreconcilable.

IV. Principled Realism Corrodes CMR

Three Pillars Under Strain

The essay identifies how principled realism undermines Huntington's three core tenets:

1. Objective Civilian Control — Requires clear, consistent strategic guidance. Principled realism's ambiguity and inconsistency frustrate the military's ability to translate strategy into operations. Example: Trump tells the UN that foreign aid will only go to "those who respect us and frankly our — our friends," contradicting his own NSS claim of being "guided by outcomes, not ideology."
2. Societal Imperative — The administration co-opts the military's public trust as a proxy for its own lack of credibility, using generals as political validators.
3. Military Professionalism — The military becomes a political object rather than a professional advisor. Without a political voice, they "give their credibility to their civilian bosses and are subject to the consequences."

The Border Deployment — Case in Point

The deployment of 5,000 troops to the US-Mexico border to address migrant "caravans" embodies all three pathologies:

• Trump threatens to withhold foreign aid from Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador — the irony being that cutting aid exacerbates the conditions driving migration
• The military is used to enforce a political narrative rather than execute a coherent security strategy
• Former generals publicly condemned the deployment as a "stunt" that uses the military as a political object

As philosopher Jacob Needleman notes: "A democratic citizen is not a citizen who can do anything he wants; it's a citizen who has an obligation at the same time."

V. The Dilemma — and the Least Sub-Optimal Choice

The Binary

• Option A (Remain apolitical): Principled realism speaks for the military, leaving them politically mute. All administration-military action carries tacit military endorsement — even when the two disagree.
• Option B (Enter the public debate): Risk being ensnared in the political tumult that is the object of public distrust, potentially undermining the trust that makes military advocacy credible in the first place.

The Middle Ground: Advocacy Short of Action

The essay argues for greater military advocacy — public voicing of advice and, if needed, dissent — that stops short of disobeying lawful orders. Advocacy preserves the democratic CMR contract while ensuring the public hears the military's actual assessment rather than only the administration's interpretation of it.

"By embarking upon this new middle ground, the US military bends traditional US CMR to meet the demands of today without breaking the CMR contract that is fundamental to the health of democratic societies."

Key Sources Referenced

• Samuel Huntington, The Soldier and the State (1957) — foundational CMR theory
• Peter Feaver, Armed Servants (2005) — agency theory and the right to be wrong
• Sarkesian & Connor, The US Military Profession into the 21st Century (2006) — challenging the traditional CMR binary
• Lindsay Cohn, "The Precarious State of Civil-Military Relations" (2018) — Trump-era CMR analysis
• Donald Travis, "Saving Samuel Huntington" (2017) — pragmatic CMR adaptation
• James Mattis — Senate testimony on foreign aid and security
• Jacob Needleman, The Inward Work of Democracy — democratic citizenship obligations
• Joseph Nye — soft, hard, and smart power
• Mitchell J. Thompson — DOD as primary foreign policy instrument
• National Security Strategy (Dec 2017) — principled realism's three pillars
• 2018 Worldwide Threat Assessment (DNI Dan Coats) — broadened functional imperative